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I. INTRODUCTION 
My assignment is to talk about the international aspects of 
control over illicit payments. The course of events in this par-
ticular area has been long, but it has not yielded much in the way 
of results. Whether the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act1 has yield-
ed a great deal in the way of results, I leave to all of you who have 
considered the matter. Certainly it has yielded much in the way of 
instruction to people in various corporations. I am somewhat im-
pressed by the amount of paper which has been produced on this 
subject. It reminds me again of the old saying to the effect that 
when the weight of the paper equals the weight of the airplane, 
the airplane will fly. I do not, however, think that is likely to be 
the case here. The weight of the paper must be extremely large 
before any United Nations action that will have any degree of ef-
fectiveness in this area takes place. 
Before discussing the United Nations and its efforts, as well 
as other international efforts, I would like to address one issue 
which has not been mentioned previously. Several references have 
been made to the fact that every country in the world has a law 
against bribery; obviously there is no question about that fact. 2 It 
is also true that most of the world's developed countries, e.g., the 
Western European countries and countries belonging to the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 
also have laws which permit tax deductions for bribes. These na-
tions obviously have some difficulty in reconciling the two con-
cepts. There is, however, a notion currently circulating in 
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Washington about cognitive dissonance, namely the ability to hold 
simultaneously two inconsistent ideas without ever letting the two 
conflict. Nonetheless, it is difficult to understand exactly how a na-
tion can have a meaningful law against bribery when it also per-
mits corporations to deduct such illicit payments as a legitimate 
business expense. 
II. EFFORTS TOWARDS ACHIEVING AN 
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT ON ILLICIT PAYMENTS 
It would be highly desirable from the point of view of the 
United States to have some kind of multinational commitment 
with respect to the outlawing of illicit payments, bribes, and cor-
rupt practices. In fact, it would be extremely desirable in light of 
the existence of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. There are 
several agencies in the United States government that, with vary-
ing degirees of vigor, and depending on certain historical and 
political factors, will enforce the law. In any case, it is the law 
which hangs over the head of American business. One frequently 
raised question concerns the degree to which the law prejudices 
the ability of Americans to compete abroad. Certainly, there has 
been a great deal of feeling on the part of American businessmen, 
who are under the strictures of the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act, that the law adversely affects their business. There is a dif-
ference in approach which has a prejudicial affect on the ability of 
American corporations to conduct business abroad.3 Consequently, 
it is highly desirable from the point of view of the U.S. govern-
ment, representing the American business community, to obtain a 
multilateral commitment on the subject. 
What, then, are the prospects for reaching such an accord? 
The prospects for achieving a multinational commitment in this 
area are dim. In the first place, there have been several attempts 
at reaching this sort of international consensus.4 In 1976, the 
OECD, an organization of some twenty-four or twenty-five in-
dustrialized countries, issued a set of decisions and guidelines for 
multinational enterprise.5 One of the OECD's guidelines included a 
3. See Wall St. J., May 30, 1979, at 6, col. 2; Singer, The Crackdown on Improper 
Corporate Payments Made Abroad, NAT'L J., June 3, 1978, at 880; Butterfield, U.S. Law 
Barring Bribes Blamed for Millions in Lost Sales in Asia, N.Y. Times, June 26, 1978, at 1, 
col. 5. 
4. See generally 61 U.N. ESCOR (Agenda Item 13, Addendum 1) at 5-6, U.N. Doc. 
E/5838 (1976). 
5. OECD, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 7 (1976). 
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statement that corporations should neither offer nor expect to 
receive offers of bribes, illicit payments, or, the like.6 The govern-
ments of all countries in the OECD have signed that endorsement. 
In addition, the governments of some OECD member states, 
primarily the United States, have circulated the guidelines to 
their business communities and others, urging that corporations 
issue oaths of loyalty conforming to the OECD standards. Many 
American corporations have done so. The governments of other 
countries have not taken this step, largely on the grounds that 
they deem it to be unnecessary. The United States will follow the 
OECD guidelines in any case. These OECD guidelines represent 
what might be described as an international agreement on 
multinational enterprise. 
In 1975, the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), under 
the leadership of Lord Shawcross of Britain, began to develop a 
set of principles which would presumably lead to the establish-
ment of a code of conduct for all businesses. The proposal included 
a procedure for hearing cases and the creation of a body acting 
partially as an information agency and partially as a semi-
adjudicatory body. The ICC has a membership in the industrializ-
ed parts of the world, consisting largely of the chambers of com-
merce. It is a reasonably homogeneous group, much like the 
OECD. This effort by the ICC progressed to a certain extent until 
it reached the stage where people began taking a serious look at 
the standards which had been drafted and the procedures which 
were going to implement those standards. At that point the whole 
effort fell apart, and nothing really has been heard of it since. 
There are, of course, a number of corporations which have an-
nounced codes of conduct, not merely in the field of illicit 
payments, but also in the area of appropriate corporate conduct in 
foreign nations. Caterpillar, Inc. was one of the first American cor-
porations to actually implement this practice. The example has 
been followed by a number of others: the National Association of 
Manufacturers, the ICC, and the National Foreign Trade Council, 
all of which have issued standards of conduct. As a result, there 
exists a large body of guidelines for American corporations and, 
perhaps, for other corporations as well. 
Insofar as the international community is concerned, the two 
things which seem to be in place at the present time are the rather 
6. Id. at 13. 
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nonexistent ICC code and the existent OECD guidelines, both of 
which are voluntary. In both cases, it was made clear that no adju-
dicatory body should pass judgment on the conduct of a particular 
country or a particular transaction, and the OECD has repeatedly 
stated this. The OECD guidelines state explicitly that no decisions 
will be issued with respect to individual cases. Sometimes, it is a 
little difficult to understand how the OECD can do what it has 
done under its mandate to review the effectiveness of the 
guidelines, without thinking about the individual cases which em-
body the decisions as to whether the standards have had any im-
pact. Likewise, it is difficult to understand how the OECD can 
review the question of effectiveness without considering the 
significance of the individual cases that provide the basis for 
review. There do exist, therefore, at least some standards on the 
international scene which may, to a certain extent, alleviate a 
troublesome situation for American corporations, which are held 
to a higher standard of conduct than are others. 
There have been other efforts in the international area that 
deserve mention, one of which can be disposed of quickly. Senate 
Resolution 265, adopted in 1975 through the initiative of Senator 
Abraham Ribicoff,7 suggested that the United States negotiate the 
proposal in Geneva at the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT).8 Senator Ribicoff suggested that the United States 
raise the question of the control of illicit payments with the other 
GATT countrie.s. Although Senator Ribicoff's view resembled the 
views of others, such as Senator William Proxmire, it was more 
realistic than some of the other proposals. In particular, Senator 
Ribicoff argued that bribes, as well as similar practices, represent 
distortions of proper trade practices. Under this premise, the 
members of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade would 
be the appropriate group to consider the question of illicit 
payments and bribes that distort the fair competition desirable in 
the field of international trade. In other words, just as dumping 
and subsidization distort normal competition, so too does the prac-
tice of making illicit payments. This premise served as the basis 
7. S. Res. 265, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). 
8. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No. 
1700, 55 U.N.T.S . 194 (effective Jan. l, 1948). For a detailed discussion and analysis of 
GATT, see J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 35-57 (1969). 
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upon which the issue was to be presented at the GATT con-
ference. But when a special trade representative presented 
Senator Ribicoff's proposal before the GATT conference, he was 
greeted with polite silence. 
The GA TT, in 1979, concluded a multilateral trade negotia-
tion. Among other things, this multilateral trade negotiation dealt 
with trade-distorting practices such as nontariff barriers, the 
questjon o[ government procurement, dumping codes, and the 
anti-subsidy or subsidies and countervailing duties. It would seem 
that the multilateral trade negotiation would have been a 
legitimate arena in which to discuss the subject, as being one more 
example of a trade distortion which ought to be regulated. 
Another area of concern involves the efforts in the United Na-
tions and the Special Committee on Illicit Payments, which was 
established some years ago by the Economic and Social Council of 
the United Nations. I have represented, for some years, and I con-
tinue to represent, the United States in the U.N. Commission on 
Transnational Corporations. In March of 1976, during the second 
meeting of that Commission in Lima, Peru, the State Department 
instructed me to bring before the conference the matter of an 
agreement on the subject of illicit payments. Instructions of this 
sort do not always conform to· the realities of the situation at hand, 
and sometimes seem unlikely to be implemented. At Lima, for ex-
ample, there was nothing on the Commission's agenda which in-
dicated that the subject of illicit payments would be discussed. In-
stead, the Commission was focusing on other aspects of the regula-
tion or conduct of transnational corporations. Nonetheless, I 
received instructions to present the subject at four o'clock on a 
Friday afternoon, with the understanding that Mr. Ingersoll, who 
was then Undersecretary of State, would make a presentation 
before Senator Proxmire's committee at the same time. Surpris-
ingly, I succeeded in introducing the subject at that time. 
The subject of illicit payments was brought up in that forum, 
at least partially, because there had been a great deal of noise 
made in the United Nations about the reprehensible conduct of 
certain corporations, which were known to be bribing govern-
ments of developed and developing countries alike. Iran was one 
of the chief proponents of this kind of activity. In Iran, under the 
Shah, there was considerable activity which fell into the category 
of reprehensible conduct. The Japanese cases were also receiving 
substantial publicity. I was, therefore, not entirely prepared for 
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the deafening silence which greeted my own suggestion that the 
Commission on Transnational Corporations take up this particular 
topic, especially since it was discussing a code of conduct to in-
struct transnational corporations on the proper mode of conduct in 
the international arena. Needless to say, I received support from 
only a few members of the Commission. Subsequently, the pro-
posal went over to the Economic and Social Council, which estab-
lished another committee, and the committee met over a number 
of years.9 
The Americans were the chief proponents of a code which 
would outlaw illicit payments in the area of international trade. 
The Americans acted not only out of a sense of their firm moral 
position, but also because the appearance of the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act was imminent. In short, the United States was 
adopting a firm policy toward illicit payments at this time. In addi-
tion, it was abandoning a policy which had been a very firm and 
determined policy under the administration of President Ford. 
This policy did not favor criminalization on the grounds that it 
would violate various extraterritorial applications of American 
law,10 and it would be almost impossible to enforce, both 
domestically and abroad. 11 As a result of these problems, the Ford 
adminstration had adopted a policy of requiring disclosure rather 
than criminalization. The Carter administration, however, in-
troduced several changes, culminating in the adoption of the 
criminalization approach.12 This change in policy met the predilec-
tions of Senator Proxmire and others, and the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act was passed without dissent- one cannot vote 
against virtue. 
Having passed the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, the United 
States began to exert pressure in the international arena for a 
mandatory code governing illicit payments. This was not a sur-
prising development. Arguably, it is logical to require that if a 
code of conduct exists, it should be enforceable, and the only way 
9. See Note, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977: A Transactional Analysis, 
13 J. !NT'L L. & ECON. 367, 382 (1979) for a more detailed description of this proposal. 
10. See Ad Hoc Committee on Foreign Payments of the Association of the Bar of the 
City of New York, REPORT ON QUESTIONABLE FOREIGN PAYMENTS BY CORPORATIONS: THE 
PROBLEM AND APPROACHES TO A SOLUTION 1 (1979). 
11. See Hearings on Foreign Corrupt Practices Before the Sen. Comm. on Banking, 
Housing and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 98-99 (1977). 
12. See generally, supra note 10, at 377-78. 
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that one can enforce a code of conduct is by making it mandatory 
and having other governments agree that it will be put into effect. 
This is, however, difficult logic for the United States because in 
every other area pertaining to the conduct of transnational cor-
porations, the United States has firmly insisted that the codes of 
conduct be voluntary. In the area where the issue has most been 
debated, namely the code of conduct being negotiated in the U .N. 
Commission on Transnational Corporations, the United States has 
always insisted that any agreements be non-mandatory. The 
United States has also insisted that the code on Restrictive 
Business Practices be voluntary. Thus, there exists a slight incon-
sistency in the American position. 
The inconsistency of the American view is of little conse-
quence because from the very beginning-when this idea was first 
put forward in March of 1976, until the last time the matter was 
discussed in 1979-it has been obvious that there was no chance of 
its gaining acceptance in the United Nations. 
Much of the difficulty in the U .N. forum and elsewhere stems 
from the extensive split between the developed and the develop-
ing countries of the world. With regard to the code of conduct on 
transnationals, for example, t here is a strong feeling on the part of 
developing countries that there must be some kind of massive 
transfer of resources from north to south, and that justice and 
equity form the basis for such a redistribution of resources. Many 
developing countries maintain that they have been exploited by 
the ex-colonial powers and that they are entitled to some kind of 
compensation as a result. This is not a basis upon which one easily 
arrives at the overall standards that will regulate a new interna-
tional economic order. This problem is obvious to nations on both 
sides. But developing countries have felt that the U.S. desire for 
an illicit payment code- resulting partially from the existence of 
the FCP A- was a bargaining point in their aspiration for the 
more general transnational code. Interestingly, America's 
Western European allies have created the greatest difficulties. 
Although the Western European countries usually side with the 
United States in most matters, whether it be Restrictive Business 
Practices or the general conduct of transnational corporations, the 
United States has not been able to obtain their support for a code 
of conduct on illicit payments in the U .N. forum. Consequently, it 
is easy to understand why, in the area of illicit payments, there is 
great difficulty in arriving at any agreed-upon code. 
7
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The problem in the United Nations stems partially from the 
fact that there exists a difference in perception between what the 
conduct really is, or what the standards of conduct really are, and 
what they are said to be. Specifically, this situation occurs when a 
nation has a law opposed to bribery, as well as a law permitting a 
tax deduction for a payment that is stated to have been made for 
the purposes of a bribe and justified as being in the regular course 
of business. For this reason, the United States has not been able 
to achieve any degree of consensus with its moral allies in the 
United Nations. 
There are several other reasons why the United States has 
not been able to achieve an agreement on a code of conduct in the 
U.N. forum. The way in which these clauses are phrased always 
raises doubt in the mind of anyone who reads them. Consider, for 
example, a clause in the proposed code by an ad hoc committee on 
illicit payments, which suggests that a corporation should not pay 
undue consideration to a government official for the performance 
or non-performance of his duties. What does it mean to say that a 
corporation should not give undue consideration to somebody for 
the performance or non-performance of his duties? Is it possible to 
give due compensation to an individual for not performing the 
duties that he should? This is characteristic of some of the dif-
ficulties which exist in respect to the situation confronting the 
United States. Partially as a result of this problem, and partially 
as a result of the wider differences which I have mentioned 
previously, the United States has not been able to get anywhere in 
the U .N. forum with this type of code. 
III. CONCLUSION 
I have reached the conclusion that America's hope for achiev-
ing an international code of conduct on illicit payments through 
negotiations in the United Nations is a forlorn one. The United Na-
tions is characterized, to a certain extent, by the analogy to the 
cross-eyed javelin thrower: he is not likely to be very productive, 
but he bears a lot of watching. One can never quite tell where that 
javelin is going to go when it gets in the hands of the United Na-
tions, though it is unlikely to be very productive from the point of 
view of American business in this particular regard. 
Returning to a point mentioned previously, I think that if one 
were to reexamine the idea presented in Senate Resolution 265 
and adopt this in the area of trade, one would be addressing the 
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problem of illicit payments in more meaningful and significant 
terms. When a large contract is lost by an American corporation 
because somebody else has paid a bribe, a trade distortion results. 
Clearly, if one were really serious about achieving a meaningful 
agreement in the area of international control of illicit payments, 
the peg on which to hang it would be trade policy and not morality. 
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